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Abst rac t - -The  preference of a voter is represented by a preference graph, and an elementary proof 
of the Dictator Theorem is given using preference matrices. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Arrow's Dictator Theorem states that if the input to a voting system is the preference of each 
voter for the candidates, then there is no reasonable way to assign a preference appropriate for 
the society as a whole. Various proofs of the theorem have appeared in the last four decades [1-3]; 
we consider the proof given here to be particularly simple. 
There are two types of directed graphs we should define before taking up the proof: preference 
graphs and nonpreference graphs. A nonpreference graph is one which is complete and transitive. 
A graph is complete if there is at least one edge, in either direction, between any pair of nodes 
(not necessarily distinct). A graph is transitive if, whenever edges (i,j) and (j,k) exist in the 
graph, then (i, k) also exists. It is well known [4] that a nonpreference graph arranges the nodes 
of a graph in a linear order, possibly some nodes clubbed together, and it can be used to represent 
the preference of a voter for the candidates. Obviously, the complement of a nonpreference graph 
can also be used to represent the preference of a voter. We call this complement, preference graph 
and its adjacency matrix, preference matrix. It is easy to see that the preference graph satisfies 
asymmetry and transitivity. The notations used in the proof are given below: 
1. m: the total number of candidates C1, C2, . . . ,  Cm. 
. 
3. 
n: the total number of voters V1, V2,..., V,. 
Vk = [v/~]: the preference matrix of order 
Vk • v -k. ,3 = 0 means that the voter Vk does not 
to represent nonpreference of a set of voters. 
m x m giving the preference of the voter 
prefer Ci over Cj. We use O, boldface zero, 
v .k. = 1 means that the voter Vk prefers Ci s3 
over C~. We use 1, boldface one, to represent preference of a set of voters, v. k.. = • means 
unspecified preference of the voter Vk. We use.,  boldface asterisk, to represent unspecified 
preference of a set of voters. 
4. S = [sq]: the preference matrix of order m × m giving the preference of the society as a 
whole. 
5. Voting System: a function F (V l ,V2 , . . .  ,Vn) = S. 
6. Dictator Function: Dkn(xl, x2,..., xn) = xk, also called projection function. 
2. AXIOMS, THEOREM,  AND PROOF 
Two axioms are assumed by Arrow in the derivation of the Dictator Theorem. 
1 2 1. Axiom of Independence: sij - - f i j (v i j ,v i j , . . . ,  V~) for i ~ j and sii = 0. 
The axiom states that sq is a function of v~'s only and nothing else. 
2. Axiom of Unanimity: fij(O,O,... ,0) = 0 and fij(1, 1 , . . . ,1)  = 1. 
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The axiom states that  if all the voters, without exception, vote one way, then the voting system 
also votes the same way. 
DICTATOR THEOREM. f l j (X l ,  x2 , . . . ,  Xn) : Dd(x l ,  X2 , . . . ,  Xn) : Xd. In other words, S = Yd. 
PROOF. Define 
h=min  xk f i j (x l ,x2 , . . . , x , )= l  . ij 
Note that  m(m - 1) 2" values of f l j  are to be inspected before we can obtain the value of h. We 
want to show that  h = 1. 
f i j(1,0,0) = 0 and fjk(0,1,0) = 0, 
=~ fik(*,*,0) = 0 since nonpreference graphs are transitive, 
f i k0 ,1 ,0 )  = 0. 
Taking the contraposit ive of the above argument,  
fik(1,1,0) = 1, 
:=~ f i j(1,0,0) = 1 or fjk(0,1,0) = 1. 
It immediately follows that  h = 1. Note that h cannot be zero because of the Unanimity axiom. 
Without  loss of generality, we may assume fab(1,0) = 1, the position at which 1 occurs in fab 
is of no concern to us. Here, Ca and Cb are two specific candidates. Now, 
f ia(1,1) = 1 and lab(l ,0) = 1, 
fib(l,*) = 1 since preference graphs are transitive, 
f ib( I ,*)  = 1 and fbj(1,1) = 1, 
:~ f / j (1,*)  = 1 since preference graphs are transitive, 
::~ fji(O,*) = 0 since preference graphs are asymmetr ic,  
/ i i (x i , * )  = x l .  
and 
The Dictator Theorem immediately follows. 
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